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Abstract
Background: Many countries have amassed antiviral stockpiles for pandemic preparedness. Despite extensive trial data and
modelling studies, it remains unclear how to make optimal use of antiviral stockpiles within the constraints of healthcare
infrastructure. Modelling studies informed recommendations for liberal antiviral distribution in the pandemic phase,
primarily to prevent infection, but failed to account for logistical constraints clearly evident during the 2009 H1N1
outbreaks. Here we identify optimal delivery strategies for antiviral interventions accounting for logistical constraints, and
so determine how to improve a strategy’s impact.
Methods and Findings: We extend an existing SEIR model to incorporate finite diagnostic and antiviral distribution
capacities. We evaluate the impact of using different diagnostic strategies to decide to whom antivirals are delivered. We
then determine what additional capacity is required to achieve optimal impact. We identify the importance of sensitive and
specific case ascertainment in the early phase of a pandemic response, when the proportion of false-positive presentations
may be high. Once a substantial percentage of ILI presentations are caused by the pandemic strain, identification of cases
for treatment on syndromic grounds alone results in a greater potential impact than a laboratory-dependent strategy. Our
findings reinforce the need for a decentralised system capable of providing timely prophylaxis.
Conclusions: We address specific real-world issues that must be considered in order to improve pandemic preparedness
policy in a practical and methodologically sound way. Provision of antivirals on the scale proposed for an effective response
is infeasible using traditional public health outbreak management and contact tracing approaches. The results indicate to
change the transmission dynamics of an influenza epidemic with an antiviral intervention, a decentralised system is required
for contact identification and prophylaxis delivery, utilising a range of existing services and infrastructure in a ‘‘whole of
society’’ response.
Citation: Moss R, McCaw JM, McVernon J (2011) Diagnosis and Antiviral Intervention Strategies for Mitigating an Influenza Epidemic. PLoS ONE 6(2): e14505.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014505
Editor: C. Todd Davis, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, United States of America
Received July 1, 2010; Accepted December 10, 2010; Published February 4, 2011
Copyright:  2011 Moss et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: Funding support was provided by the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) through Capacity Building (Grant 358425), Urgent
Research (Grant 410224) and Career Development Award Schemes (J. McVernon, Grant 566635). The funders had no role in study design, data collection and
analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: rgmoss@unimelb.edu.au
Introduction
Governments and public health agencies around the world
extensively revised influenza pandemic preparedness strategies in
the early 21st century, primarily in response to the H5N1 avian
influenza epizootic and its attendant risks to humans [1,2]. With
many other developed countries, Australia amassed large stock-
piles of the neuraminidase inhibitors oseltamivir and zanamivir in
anticipation of such a public health emergency [3]. The AHMPPI
placed considerable emphasis on constraining spread of the virus
through early case detection and isolation, with quarantine and
provision of chemoprophylaxis to close contacts [4]. Two phases
with differential intensity of case-finding termed ‘‘Contain’’ and
‘‘Sustain’’ were described in which antivirals were employed as a
key strategy to limit the growth rate of the epidemic, in order to
‘‘buy time’’ for roll-out of strain-specific vaccine (‘‘Control’’ phase)
[4]. The target clinical attack rate by which successful mitigation
was defined in planning scenarios was 10% or less [4]. [5].
Given the very recent availability of NAIs for such widespread
use [6,7], there was no relevant field experience to inform optimal
deployment. Mathematical models of population transmission
were used to infer likely effects on epidemic dynamics [8–14],
using data from human and animal studies of experimental
infection [15,16] and efficacy trials conducted within the
household unit [17,18]. Model findings informed recommenda-
tions for liberal antiviral distribution early in pandemic responses
[19,20], primarily for prevention of infection [8,21].
These strategies were put to the test in the influenza A (H1N1)
2009 pandemic. In Australia, the implementation of the
‘‘Contain’’ strategy lasted for several weeks in some Australian
states, prior to switching to a more proportionate ‘‘Protect’’ phase
given the generally mild nature of observed disease. In the
planning phase, sufficient stockpiling and distribution of resources,
along with rapid and clear two-way communications were
identified as critical determinants of success both within Australia
[22,23] and internationally [19,20]. Further issues identified in the
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included excessive administrative burden on general practices
(GPs), delays in receiving test results, centralised bottlenecks, a lack
of clear communication, updates to the AHMPPI that some
considered ‘‘not entirely workable’’ and that were applied
inconsistently, inadequately detailed planning and other real-
world complexities [21,24–26].
In particular, delays in diagnosis and antiviral distribution
reduce the impact of an antiviral intervention. In comparison to
laboratory-based molecular diagnosis tests such as polymerase
chain reaction (PCR), rapid point-of-care tests (POCTs) may help
reduce these delays by providing an immediate (albeit less
sensitive) diagnosis option. The use of these POCT s to help
contain an influenza outbreak has been studied in the context of
the 2008 World Youth Day [27,28], where PCRtests did not
demonstrate a higher utility when turnaround times were included
[28]. Depending on the logistics of a pandemic response, POCT s
may prove a more effective diagnostic tool for antiviral distribution
than PCRtests.
In addition to the benefits of timely diagnosis, timely
surveillance data is critical for appropriately adjusting the
healthcare response [29]; widespread use of POCT s could reduce
the diagnostic load on laboratories and improve the turnaround of
surveillance reports. For example, the Victorian experience of the
2009 epidemic suggests that the influenza circulation was similar
to moderate seasonal influenza activity at most [3,30], but the high
workload prevented subtyping of all specimens [31] and
laboratories ultimately limited test capacity to high-risk patients
[32]. The mild nature of the 2009 pandemic also served to
confound the planned interventions due to a low proportion of
pandemic infections presenting to healthcare facilities. Given the
limits on antiviral distribution and other logistical constraints that
were identified in 2009 pandemic responses world-wide [33], the
impact of an antiviral intervention strategy on influenza
transmission in a future pandemic remains uncertain and requires
further investigation.
We identify the optimal diagnostic strategies for antiviral
distribution within the logistical constraints of the health services
sector observed in the Australian response to the Influenza A
H1N1 2009 pandemic, which are likely to be similar (within an
order of magnitude) in other developed countries. We then
evaluate the relative benefits of investing additional resources in
either laboratory or drug distribution capability for intervention
effectiveness.
We have extended an existing Susceptible Exposed Infectious
Recovered (SEIR) model [9,10] to account for presentations at
multiple locations (hospitals, GP s and flu clinics), the diagnosis
and treatment strategies available at each location, and the finite
diagnostic and antiviral distribution capacities of the pandemic
response. We show the optimal diagnostic strategy for targeting
antiviral distribution is to use PCRtests until lab diagnostic
capacity is exceeded, and then use syndromic diagnosis from this
point. Increased antiviral distribution capacity is shown to greatly
improve strategy impact, while increased lab diagnostic capacity is
shown to have negligible effect on impact. This is at odds with
widespread recommendations to greatly increase lab diagnostic
capacity to improve pandemic responses [19,33].
Methods
The deterministic model presented here is based on an existing
SEIR model that captures disease status and contact status as
separate states [9,10]; full details are given in Supplementary
Material S1, S1. Novel features of this extended model include
using case severity to determine the likely location of presenta-
tion—with implications for diagnostic facilities and treatment—
and to predict the effects of having limited diagnostic and antiviral
distribution capacities. With this model, different diagnostic
strategies were evaluated for their ability to identify sufficient
pandemic presentations for antiviral interventions in order to
successfully mitigate an influenza epidemic. Antiviral drugs were
deployed from a finite stockpile, similar in size to that existing in
Australia prior to the 2009 winter [8].
To account for model sensitivity to individual parameters, Latin
hypercube sampling (LHS) was used to take many representative
samples of the model dynamics across the parameter space. By
using this approach we obtained results for thousands of simulated
epidemics, and so statistical analyses were used to understand the
model behaviour.
The extensions to the original SEIR model are now presented in
detail, followed by a description of the epidemic scenarios that
were considered and an overview of the analysis techniques that
were applied.
Case severity and presentation
Our assumptions about case severity and presentation are
depicted in Figure 1. We assume that all severe cases present for
diagnosis at hospitals, and the proportion of pandemic infections
that are severe (g) is assumed to be between 0:1% and 10%. For
simplicity, we assume that all flu-like hospital presentations receive
diagnosis and treatment without delay, and that the diagnosis is
100% sensitive and specific in this setting. These simplifying
assumptions do not compromise the validity of the model, as the
treatment of severe cases (whether effective or not) has little impact
on the community transmission of pandemic influenza, given that
severe cases are only a small proportion of the total case load and
that treatment does not significantly reduce infectiousness [18,34].
Of the remaining cases (mild and asymptomatic), we assume
that a fraction am present to outpatient facilities; we understand
two models— GP s and flu clinics—with different diagnosis
strategies. We assume that outpatient consultation capacity is
sufficient for all flu-like presentations to receive timely consulta-
tion, and that the proportion of mild cases that present is
influenced by the prevalence of severe cases (am varies from 10%
to 50% in proportion to g). Mild cases are the key to controlling
community transmission, and unlike severe cases there is
incomplete ascertainment due to limited presentation levels with
additional challenges for disease control arising from the imperfect
timeliness and precision of diagnosis. Moreover, such cases may
not present in a timely way due either to delayed health-care
seeking or service availability constraints. During the 2009 H1N1
pandemic response in Australia, individuals presenting beyond the
48-hour window of established antiviral efficacy were not offered
antiviral treatment. While such individuals are not explicitly
considered within the model, they are implicitly subsumed into the
non-presenting proportion.
Outpatient diagnosis strategies for antiviral deployment
Several diagnostic strategies were evaluated for their ability to
target outpatient presentations for antiviral interventions in order
to successfully mitigate an influenza epidemic. The time taken to
transport samples to external laboratories from GP s is assumed to
reduce the effectiveness of any delivered antivirals. For simplifi-
cation the influenza-like illness (ILI) case definition is assumed to
be 100% sensitive for pandemic influenza, although this is
certainly not true in practice [35], while the specificity is
dependant on the proportion of ILI presentations infected with
pandemic influenza and varies throughout the epidemic. Of all
Antiviral Interventions
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definition are candidates for antiviral treatment, subject to a
positive result from the chosen outpatient diagnosis strategy. Post-
exposure prophylaxis is also delivered to identified contacts of
those who return a positive result.
Given a finite diagnostic capacity, the number of pandemic
presentations that are tested depends on the proportion of ILI
presentations that are infected with the pandemic strain. In
Figure 2, the number of pandemic influenza hospitalisations (per
week) [36] is used to illustrate the timing of the 2009 epidemic in
Victoria, Australia, and results from Victorian sentinel surveillance
show that as the epidemic progressed, the proportion of outpatient
ILI presentations due to pandemic influenza rose from 0% to
approximately 60% [31,37]. We fit a linear model to predict the
proportion of ILI presentations that are infected with the
pandemic strain, which is presented in Supplementary Material
S1, S2.1.
We considered five diagnostic strategies, based on some that
were deployed in the 2009 pandemic response and others that
could conceivably be deployed in the future. The parameters for
each diagnostic strategy are listed in Table 1 and we now
introduce each in turn.
Molecular diagnosis methods. Molecular diagnosis
methods such as PCRtests are resource-intensive and conducted
at external laboratories. As when used in the hospital setting, we
assume that these ‘‘gold standard’’ methods have perfect sensitivity
and specificity. However, when ordered from outpatient facilities,
transport delays and turnaround time reduce the effectiveness of
delivered antivirals (we assume a reduction of 30%) and thus
reduce the effective sensitivity and specificity of the diagnosis
strategy. We estimate a national capacity of 104 PCRtests per
day, based on personal communications with Dominic Dwyer
(Westmead Hospital, NSW).
Rapid testing. Based on studies of the performance of rapid
POCTs [27,28], we considered twostrategiesforusing theseteststo
target outpatient presentations for antiviral interventions: on-site
testing as performed in the POCT studies, and sending the swabs to
external laboratories for analysis. When used in the Australian 2009
pandemic response, the POCT s were sent to external laboratories
for analysis because no financial compensation was available for
POCT s analysed in near-patient settings; this is reflected in our
second POCT strategy. Since POCT s are less time-consuming to
analyse than PCRtests, we estimated a diagnostic capacity 10 times
greater than that for PCRtests. As for molecular diagnosis methods,
transport delays and turnaround time reduce antiviral effectiveness
by 30%.
Syndromic diagnosis. In contrast to the molecular and
virologic tests introduced above, we also considered targeting
antiviral interventions based on the syndromic diagnosis of
patients meeting the ILI case definition. Since every ILI
presentation is positively diagnosed, all true positives are
correctly identified (since we assume that the ILI case definition
Figure 2. The proportion of ILI cases infected with pandemic
influenza increases as the epidemic progresses. This is illustrated
by comparing surveillance data for the 2009 epidemic with pandemic
influenza hospitalisations (per week) from Victoria, Australia. The
proportion of ILI cases infected with pandemic influenza rose from
0% to approximately 60% over a two month period. We use the
observed correlation to infer a linear model for the proportion of ILI
presentations that are infected with the pandemic strain over time.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014505.g002
Figure 1. The severity and location of pandemic presentations. Of all pandemic infections (calculated in the model through the SEIR
dynamics) a proportion g are severe. Of the remainder, (1{g), a proportion am present to outpatient facilities. All severe cases present to hospitals for
treatment; a fraction of these cases are admitted to intensive care units (ICUs). Mild cases present to general practices (GPs) and flu clinics for
treatment and contact tracing. Effectiveness of antiviral interventions on the different groups accounts for setting-specific losses due to late
presentation, testing delays and personnel constraints.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014505.g001
Antiviral Interventions
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( i. e. each ILI presentation not infected with the pandemic strain)
is erroneously diagnosed.
Combined strategy: PCR/syndromic. The final strategy
was to use a combination of molecular and syndromic diagnosis to
target antiviral interventions. In the early phase of the epidemic,
PCRtests are used as the number of cases is low and few ILI
presentations are infected with the pandemic strain. Once the
PCRdiagnostic capacity is exceeded by the number of ILI
presentations, syndromic diagnosis is used as the decision
making strategy. The majority of ILI presentations are likely to
be infected with the pandemic strain by this stage (demonstrated in
Figure 2).
Antiviral intervention and vaccination
Treatment was delivered to all severe cases and, subject to a
maximal delivery rate of 104 doses per day, treatment was also
delivered to all positively diagnosed ILI presentations who had not
previously received antivirals for prophylaxis. Prophylaxis, also
subject to maximal delivery rate of 104 doses per day, was
delivered to identified contacts of all severe cases and all positively
diagnosed ILI presentations. Studies have shown that people have
around 20–30 contacts on average [38,39], about half of which are
readily identifiable (e. g. people they live or work with), and these
estimates were used in our model.
The maximal prophylaxis delivery rate of 104 doses per day was
based on an aspirational target of providing prophylaxis for
contacts of 103 cases per day, on the assumption that around 10
contacts per case receive prophylaxis. The constraint on treatment
delivery was also 104 doses per day, but this value is less significant
since treatment has minimal effect on transmission in this model.
In addition, a vaccine was introduced to the population at a rate
of 0:75 million doses per week (one dose per person), with
seroconversion in 70% of recipients starting 20 weeks into the
epidemic. The vaccine did not provide perfect protection against
the pandemic strain but reduced susceptibility by 70%, which is
similar to existing estimates of vaccine efficacy against suscepti-
bility [40].
Epidemic scenario
Epidemic scenarios were randomly chosen from predefined
distributions for each of the model parameters; these distributions
are presented in Supplementary Material S1, S2.2. In brief, we
assumed a basic reproductive number of R0&1:4 in a fully
susceptible population, where treatment had minimal effect on
infectiousness and where prophylaxis moderately reduced suscep-
tibility, but breakthrough cases had little reduction in infectious-
ness. Individuals were assumed to have around 30 contacts during
the Contain phase and 20 contacts post-Contain [8], of which half
were assumed to be readily identifiable for the purposes of
prophylaxis distribution. We chose to evaluate the diagnosis
strategies for targeting antiviral interventions in scenarios more
severe than the 2009 pandemic, which had an estimated final
attack rate of up to 10% [41] with strong suggestive evidence of
prior immunity [42,43]. We compare our chosen scenarios to the
2009 H1N1 pandemic in Supplementary Material S1, S2.3.
Model analysis
The model dynamics were analysed using LHS, a biased
statistical sampling method for generating plausible collections of
parameter values from multidimensional distributions. When
taking a number of samples (S) of the model parameters, the
range of each parameter is divided into S equally probable
intervals, and a value is chosen at random from each interval.
This ensures that the ensemble of parameter values is represen-
tative of the real variability of the parameters, unlike traditional
(i. e. ‘‘brute force’’) random sampling, which provides no such
guarantee.
The results presented in this paper were generated by taking
2,000 samples of the model parameter space for each value of the
control parameter(s); typically the control parameter is the proportion
of infections that are severe (g). Given the statistical nature of this
analysis technique, the impact of a strategy was specified as the
percentage of simulations where the final attack rate was less than
the 10% target attack rate specified in the AHMPPI (similar target
rates have been used in US studies [44]). In our results, we show
that this is a valid measure of impact.
Results
With the extended SEIR model presented here, several
experiments were undertaken to identify: the diagnostic strategies
that have the greatest impact; how the impact of using POCT s is
affected by their sensitivity; and how the logistical constraints
identified in this paper affect the impact of the strategies employed.
Impact of Diagnosis Strategies
The impact of any intervention (except population-wide
vaccination) is determined in part by the proportion of infected
persons that present. Since severity is assumed to be the driver for
mild presentations, the impact of each diagnosis strategy increases
as the severity (g) of the epidemic increases. As shown in Figure 3,
the strategies with the greatest impact are PCRand PCR
/syndromic, followed by syndromic diagnosis, while the two
POCT strategies have no impact.
The validity of measuring impact as the proportion of
simulations where the final attack rate was less than 10% is
demonstrated in Figure 4. Without an intervention the unmiti-
gated epidemic results in a final attack rate of 48–53%; successful
strategies such as syndromic diagnosis and PCRreduce the size of
this peak and produce a long tail. Such strategies also exhibit a
secondary peak for attack rates of 0–5%, indicating an ‘‘all or
nothing’’ effect. As we have previously shown [8], a finite stockpile
of antivirals administered in isolation does little to reduce the final
size of an epidemic, but may delay its peak. Scenarios in which the
attack rate is reduced below the target threshold of 10% are those
in which antivirals successfully buy time for vaccine implementa-
tion to control the outbreak. Across the different strategies, those
with greater impact exhibit a smaller peak at high attack rates and
Table 1. Parameters for the diagnostic strategies available at
outpatient locations.
PCR
POCT
(lab) POCT (local) Syndromic
True Positives 100% 56% 56% 100%
True Negatives 100% 90% 90% 0%
Capacity (diagnoses
per day)
104 105 ??
Antiviral Effectiveness
(G Ps)
70% 70% 100% 100%
True positives and negatives are the proportion of outpatient presentations
meeting the ILI case definition that are correctly identified as being infected
and uninfected, respectively, with the pandemic strain. These are not
equivalent to sensitivity and specificity values.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014505.t001
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the size of the two peaks demonstrates that our measure of impact
is valid.
Even where the epidemic is not successfully curtailed by
immunisation, use of antivirals to constrain transmission may slow
the rate of epidemic growth. Delays of several weeks to the time of
median infection are observed when the severity (and hence the
presenting proportion) is high (Figure 5A). Figure 5B reports the
maximum number of clinical presentations per day in the context
of the antiviral intervention. This figure is more complex to
interpret, as symptomatic cases are expected to increase as a
function of severity. It should be noted however, that as severity
approaches 10%, the median number of presentations reported
from the simulations begins to plateau. The declining median
reflects successful containment by vaccination in a proportion of
simulations, demonstrated by the downturn in the 5th centile
values.
The negligible impact of the POCT strategies is due to their
relatively low sensitivity (&56% [27]). As shown in Figure 6, if we
assumethePOCTsare100% sensitivethentheimpactofthePOCT
near-patient strategy equals that of the PCRand PCR/syndromic
strategies. However, as POCT sensitivity decreases, the impact is
greatly reduced; impact is negligible when the sensitivity is 80%.
The impact of analysing POCT s at external labs is much lower
than the near-patientstrategy;the optimal POCTimpact(i. e. given
100% sensitivity) is decreased from 12% to 4%. This three-fold
reduction is due to the sole distinction between the two strategies:
the effectiveness of treatment and prophylaxis delivered in response
to GP presentations is decreased by 30% under the lab-based
strategy. Since half of the mild presentations occur at GP s (on
average), thereduced impact isequivalent tothat ofthe near-patient
POCT strategy with a sensitivity of only 85%, which highlights the
importance of sensitive diagnosis and timely interventions.
In practice, the effective sensitivity of POCT s can be increased by
performing cluster testing (e. g. across school classes or household
units), but while cluster testing may be useful in identifying outbreaks
in relatively closed communities (e. g. schools and events such as
World Youth Day), it is unlikely to be of use in identifying the
majority of cases once widespread community transmission is
established. POCT sensitivity may also be higher in children than
in adults [45]; since youth transmission initially sustained the
epidemic in Victoria, Australia [46] and played an important role
in the UK [41], the effective sensitivity of POCT s may well be higher
than the estimate of 56% used here. However, even at these higher
values (&75%) the impact would still have been minimal in
comparison to the PCRand PCR/Syndromic strategies.
Figure 3. The impact of using each diagnosis strategy, for
different presentation rates of mild cases (am). As mild-
presentations constitute the bulk of all symptomatic infections, if only
a small percentage of them present to outpatient facilities, then an
intervention (based on any diagnostic strategy) is unable to control the
epidemic. If approximately one in three or more mild cases presents,
then there is a non-negligible chance that an epidemic may be
controlled given an appropriate diagnostic strategy is employed. The
probability of control rises rapidly with the proportion of mild cases
that presents. Maximal impact is achieved with the PCR and PCR/
Syndromic strategies. A syndromic strategy is less effective. The POCT
strategies have negligible impact (the curves lie on the horizontal zero
axis).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014505.g003
Figure 4. Probability densities of attack rate show the interventions have an ‘‘all or nothing’’ impact. A: Kernel smoothing density
estimates for g~10% ( i. e. maximum severity). Both interventions shift the density leftwards, the expected attack rate now marginally less than
without intervention. The PCR/Syndromic intervention shows a clear second peak at very low values for the attack rate. Few simulations result in an
attack rate in the intervening space: the ‘‘all or nothing’’ impact. B: A magnified view of the shaded region in A, showing the second peak for the
PCR/Syndromic strategy. The peak captures the simulations whereby antiviral distribution delayed the epidemic for sufficient time for the vaccine to
be deployed and provide definitive control of the epidemic. It is noteworthy that almost all of the density under 10% (our and the AHMPPI ’s working
definition for successful mitigation) is in fact under 1%.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014505.g004
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Capacity
Given that the PCRand PCR/syndromic strategies have the
greatest impact, it is instructive to analyse how the logistical
constraints identified in this paper affect the impact of these two
strategies. Recall that these diagnosis and antiviral delivery
constraints limit the ability to diagnose presenting cases and to
deliver prophylaxis to contacts of diagnosed cases, respectively. It
is clear that these two constraints interact: given a low diagnosis
capacity it is not possible to deliver a large amount of prophylaxis,
regardless of the delivery capacity; conversely, given a low delivery
capacity, additional diagnosis capacity will not produce an
increased impact. Ideally these two constraints would be matched,
with the diagnostic capacity capable of saturating—but not
exceeding—the available delivery capacity.
Figures 7A and 7B show the impact of the PCRand PCR/
syndromic strategies, respectively, for a range of diagnostic and
delivery capacities. Both strategies have an optimal impact of 27%,
reinforcing the earlier result that these two strategies have similar
impacts. However, when the diagnostic capacity is less than 5000
tests per day, the PCR/syndromic strategy has much greater
impact than the PCRstrategy; this is because the diagnostic
capacity is not sufficient for PCRtests to instigate maximal delivery
of prophylaxis.
Under these conditions, the PCR/syndromic strategy has the
greatest impact when prophylaxis delivery is capped at 5|104
doses per day; when the delivery capacity is greater, the impact of
this strategy is reduced by 2% due to excessive delivery of
prophylaxis to contacts of persons that are not infected with the
pandemic strain. Once the diagnostic capacity is greater than 5000
tests per day, syndromic diagnosis is delayed until the proportion
of ILI presentations infected with the pandemic strain is
sufficiently high (§15%) and delivery of prophylaxis to non-
pandemic contacts does not reduce the PCR/syndromic impact.
As the diagnostic capacity is increased, both the PCRand PCR/
syndromic strategies approach maximal impact (27%); a capacity
of 5|103 is sufficient to achieve maximal impact using the PCR/
syndromic strategy, while a capacity of 2|104 is needed to
achieve maximal impact using the PCRstrategy. This four-fold
difference in diagnostic capacities demonstrates that once a high
proportion of ILI presentations are infected with the pandemic
strain, syndromic diagnosis is more effective than using PCRtests,
within the logistical constraints identified here.
From this analysis, one may infer that the optimal combination
of capacities is such that the diagnostic capacity is sufficient to
saturate—but not overload—the prophylaxis delivery capacity.
Assuming that incidence of the pandemic strain peaks at 65% of
ILI, the optimal strategy is to continue with PCRtests until the
available lab capacity is only 65% of the daily number of samples,
then switching to syndromic diagnosis. Such a strategy requires
instant surveillance data and that PCRlab capacity is devoted
solely to testing the samples delivered that day, ignoring any
backlog of samples from previous days—both assumptions are
highly unrealistic. Furthermore, a few days (at most) would elapse
between the saturation of PCRlab capacity and this optimal
switching time. Meanwhile, the combined PCR/syndromic
strategy (Figure 7B) has very similar impact and is also realistically
achievable.
This model assumes a homogeneous population and uniform
distribution of diagnostic capacity, whereas an actual epidemic will
be inhomogeneous across the country [47]. Thus, the recom-
mended course of action is for each locality (i. e. state) to use
PCRtests as the decision making tool until the locally available lab
capacity is exceeded, at which point the presentation of ILI should
be used as the decision making tool.
Figures 7A and 7B show the impact of the PCRand PCR/
syndromic strategies, where the grey circles indicate our estimates
of the current Australian healthcare system resources; in both
cases, the current constraints are decidedly sub-optimal. On each
figure, arrows indicate alternate courses for increasing these
resources and it is apparent that the most effective course differs
depending on which diagnosis strategy is used. Increasing the
maximal prophylaxis delivery rate produces the largest increase in
impact for either strategy; for the PCRstrategy a further (small)
Figure 5. Timing and peak load of the epidemic as a function of the proportion of cases who are severe, under a PCR/Syndromic
strategy. A: Time to median infection (50% of the final attack rate), in relation to influenza severity under the antiviral intervention. The solid line
reports the median value from 2,000 simulations, dashed lines represent 5th and 95th centiles. As severity (and hence the presenting proportion)
increases, more cases are amenable to intervention, resulting in delays in epidemic growth of several weeks. At low severity the variation in model
outputs is due to LHS parameter sampling. The upward trend in the 5th,5 0 th and 95th centiles with increasing severity shows the impact of the
intervention to slow transmission, even where definitive control is not achieved. The increased scatter of observed values at high severity
assumptions (characterised by increased upward trend in the 95th centile) reflects the ability of the vaccine to provide definitive control in a minority
of simulations (see Figure 4). B: Maximum daily clinical presentations, in relation to influenza severity under the antiviral intervention. The solid line
reports the median value from 2,000 simulations, dashed lines represent 5th and 95th centiles. Presenting cases necessarily increase with epidemic
severity given the model’s assumptions. However, when severity is high (9–10%) the 5th centile values collapse to approach 0, denoting the
successfully ‘‘mitigated’’ (due to vaccination) epidemics.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014505.g005
Antiviral Interventions
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capacity. In both cases, the impact is optimal when the maximal
delivery of prophylaxis is increased ten-fold,t o105 doses per day.
Discussion
Key findings
The impact of any combination of diagnosis strategies and antiviral
intervention on an influenza epidemic depends on the proportion of
infections that present, the inherent properties of the diagnosis
strategy and antiviral intervention, and the constraints placed upon
the intervention by limited healthcare resources. The key attributes of
a successful diagnostic strategy were shown to be a large diagnostic
capacity and very high sensitivity. Intheearlystages of an epidemic—
when the proportion of ILI presentations infected with the pandemic
strain is negligible—it is also important that the strategy is highly
specific, to make optimal use of the limited antiviral distribution
capacity and to avoid early depletion of the antiviral stockpile.
The optimal strategy for targeting antiviral interventions was a
combination of PCRtests early in the epidemic, and syndromic
diagnosis once the PCRlab capacity was exceeded; this strategy is
estimated to have a 12% chance of mitigating an extremely severe
epidemic. Because of the ability to switch to syndromic diagnosis,
the results suggest that directing additional resources to increasing
laboratory diagnostic throughput will have negligible influence on
the impact of a strategy of mass antiviral prophylaxis.
Using PCRtests as the sole diagnostic tool resulted in a similar
impact, under the unlikely assumption that the lab capacity was
devoted solely to testing newly-arrived samples and that any
backlog was ignored. The use of syndromic diagnosis from the
outset was shown to have less impact—a 2% chance of
mitigation—due to very low specificity in the early stages of the
epidemic, while POCT s were shown have no impact, due to low
sensitivity. The sensitivity of POCT s could be improved by
performing cluster testing, an option that was not explored here.
Based on the estimates of the current logistical constraints of
the healthcare system, a sensitivity analysis was conducted to
determine how the impact of the most successful strategies
were affected by the available diagnostic and delivery
capacities. The estimated Australian PCRdiagnostic capacity
of 104 tests per day was shown to be optimal for the PCR/
syndromic strategy and near-optimal for the PCRstrategy. In
contrast, the maximal rate of prophylaxis delivery was
estimated to be an order of magnitude less than the optimal
rate of 105 doses per day, with significant implications for
epidemic mitigation. These findings suggest that optimal
allocation of additional resources to build capacity should be
directed towards drug delivery rather than laboratory testing.
Strengths and weaknesses
We have made a number of simplifying assumptions to ensure
that our model is tractable. Population heterogeneity and
Figure 6. The impact of POCT s is hampered by low sensitivity.
POCT s strategies are in principle capable of achieving equivalent
results to PCR/Syndromic based strategies for antiviral deployment if
sensitivity for the test is 100% and the outcome is assessed without
delay (POCT (near-patient) for a sensitivity of 100%). The proportion of
simulations in which control is achieved diminishes rapidly with falling
sensitivity. Current sensitivity is around 60%. Transporting samples to
external labs, thus introducing a delay from testing to provision of
antiviral agents, further reduces the impact (POCT (lab)). The horizontal
line marks the maximal impact of the PCR /Syndromic strategy.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014505.g006
Figure 7. Impact of the PCR and PCR/Syndromic strategies, over a range of logistical constraints. A: Impact of using PCR tests. B: Impact
when switching to syndromic diagnosis once PCR diagnostic capacity is exceeded. For both figures, the proportion of simulations that are effectively
controlledincreasesnon-linearly withboth diagnostic(PCR)capacity andthe maximumdailyantiviral prophylaxis deliverycapacity.Black circles indicate
estimates of current Australian constraints; arrows indicate the direction in which to increase these resources to optimally increase the impact.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014505.g007
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cases have identical infectiousness. While the model does not
consider the influence of emergent resistance to antiviral agents on
intervention effectiveness, modelling studies that account for
resistance suggest that widespread antiviral deployment would
remain an effective mitigation strategy [9,48–55].
We assume that diagnosis at flu clinics is sufficiently rapid to
deliver timely treatment to patients and timely prophylaxis to
contacts, that the available hospital capacity can cater for all severe
cases, and only consider those cases as ‘‘presenting’’ who attend
medical services in a timely manner. At the beginning of the
epidemic the whole population is susceptible (i. e. immunologically
naive). The model is also non-stochastic (deterministic), which can
be problematic when REff  & 1.
The strength of this model lies in the ability to account for
pragmatic issues; while previous modelling studies have aimed to
identify optimal vaccine distribution strategies (e. g. [56,57]),
predicting the effects of diagnosis and distribution capacities on the
impact of antiviral interventions is a novel application of SEIR
models, and the results highlight the importance of specific
planning to develop feasible and effective healthcare responses.
Significantly, by taking into account logistical constraints that
were observed in pandemic responses world-wide, our results
suggest the increasing lab diagnostic capacity may have little or no
effect on the impact of a pandemic response.
Implications for healthcare policy
The optimal antiviral targeting strategy identified here is to use
PCRtests to diagnose pandemic cases until the available lab
capacity is exceeded, from which point syndromic diagnosis (the
presence of ILI symptoms) should be used. Solely using PCRtests
for the duration of the epidemic can produce a similar impact
when priority is given to the most recently received samples, but
this strategy is more resource-intensive and would place great
stress on the labs and on the couriers transporting samples to the
labs; the last-in first-served test analysis is also unlikely to be
realised, due to practical considerations such as the role that labs
play in surveillance.
Given our estimates of the current capacity constraints of the
healthcare system, the optimal strategies have a 12% chance of
mitigating an epidemic (under the scenarios described in the
Methods section) when the severity is highest (g~10%), since this
drives the greatest proportion of mild cases to present. Contrary to
expectations, a sensitivity analysis of these strategies showed that
the PCRdiagnostic capacity is optimal and that the ability to
deliver large amounts of prophylaxis on a daily basis is the key
constraint. This suggests that capacity building resources would be
better committed to developing creative approaches to decen-
tralised contact identification and delivery, rather than increasing
lab diagnostic capacity. Compared to our estimated rate of 104
doses per day, the optimal rate is 105 doses per day, which more
than doubles the chance of mitigating an epidemic to 27%.A n
added advantage of adopting a decentralized approach is the
ability to reduce peak workload on specialized public health
response teams, reducing burnout and ensuring ongoing capability
to respond to evolving priorities as the epidemic unfolds.
Achieving this delivery rate represents a serious challenge for
the healthcare sector. Notwithstanding ethical and legal compli-
cations, this is not an insurmountable goal; Australia Post delivers
around 5:5 billion articles per year (i. e. 15 million per day) to almost
11 million addresses inside Australia, with 95:5% of articles being
delivered on time and 98:8% of delivery points being serviced 5z
days per week [58]. The Mail & Networks division of Australia
Post has 18,000 full-time employees, 5,600 part-time employees
and 5,400 ‘‘other’’ employees, for a total of 29,000 people [58]; to
deliver 105 doses of prophylaxis per day, a workforce of 25,000
people across the nation could be tasked with delivering
prophylaxis to four persons every day. This demonstrates that a
decentralised delivery infrastructure could deliver the necessary
number of prophylaxis doses, assuming that solutions can be found
for the associated ethical and legal issues. Adoption of this ‘‘whole
of society’’ strategy further offloads pressure on the health sector,
which has sole capability to deliver other essential acute care
services that will be operating at full surge capacity during a raging
epidemic.
Creative solutions were employed during the 2009 pandemic
response locally and internationally, to facilitate prescribing and
distribution of antiviral agents. In the state of Victoria in Australia,
couriers were initially used to distribute prophylactic antiviral
agents prescribed through the Department of Human Services, a
role that could similarly have been fulfilled by Australia Post (Dr
Rosemary Lester, personal communication). Within weeks of the
outbreak’s commencement, Division 1 nurses were given the right
to prescribe antiviral drugs for prophylaxis without medical
consultation [59]. Building on the existing capacity of telephone
consultation services provided through the NHS, the United
Kingdom implemented a National Pandemic Flu Service for self-
care advice via internet or telephone to reduce the pressure on
primary care and General Practitioners [60].
The maximal impact of the strategies considered here is a 27%
chance to mitigate an epidemic, given a 10-fold increase in
prophylaxis delivery and a mild presentation proportion of 50%.
This low impact (a 1-in-4 chance) indicates the importance of
effective social interventions (such as school closures and the
cancellation of public events) to reduce exposure to the pandemic
strain [61]. Evidence from Japan is suggestive that widespread use
of antivirals and widespread school closures were highly effective
in 2009 [62] and school closures were also found to be effective in
Hong Kong in 2009 [63]. The ability of such measures to reduce
the effective reproduction rate can greatly increase the impact of
the strategies presented here.
Furthermore, when the proportion of infected persons that
present is low, antiviral interventions will have minimal impact at
best and there is little to distinguish between the available
diagnosis strategies. To illustrate this point, the 2009 pandemic
was milder than expected, with a low proportion of presentations;
accordingly, none of the strategies described here are likely to have
had any impact on the epidemic.
Summary
We address specific real-world issues that must be considered in
order to improve pandemic preparedness policy in a practical and
methodologically sound way. Consistent with expectations, we
identify the importance of sensitive and specific case ascertainment
in the early phase of a pandemic response, when the proportion of
false-positive presentations may be predicted to be high. However,
once a substantial percentage of ILI presentations are caused by
the pandemic strain, identification of cases (and contacts) to be
treated on syndromic grounds alone results in a more streamlined
response that has greater potential to be effective than a
laboratory-dependent strategy. Beyond this threshold, there is
little benefit for the outcome of the antiviral intervention in
increasing laboratory diagnostic capacity—rather, our model’s
findings reinforce the need for a decentralised drug delivery system
capable of providing prophylaxis to contacts in a timely manner.
Provision of antivirals on the scale proposed for an effective
response is infeasible using traditional public health outbreak
management and contact tracing approaches. The results indicate
Antiviral Interventions
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dynamics of an influenza epidemic, a decentralised system is
required for contact identification and prophylaxis delivery,
utilising a range of existing services and infrastructure in a ‘‘whole
of society’’ response.
Whilst some countries have considered utilising decentralised
infrastructures, centralised systems remain the dominant platform
for pandemic response strategies. In addition, reviews of pandemic
preparedness have recommended greatly increasing laboratory
diagnostic capacity [20], while the logistics of prophylaxis
distribution have received less attention. Our results present a
challenge to this status quo.
Supporting Information
Supplementary Material S1 We provide the details of the
model, including all of the model equations, in Section S1. The
model parameters are then described in detail, including the
probability distributions used for the Latin hypercube sampling
(LHS), in Section S2.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014505.s001 (0.17 MB
PDF)
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